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1Resumen: En tiempos de creciente competencia internacional las empresas demandan conce-
siones por parte de los empleados para llevar a cabo medidas de reestructuraci￿n necesarias, que
en parte puede ser resistida por los trabajadores, cuyo comportamiento en el trabajo no puede ser
contratado plenamente. Al mismo tiempo, las compensaciones gerenciales son percibidas como de-
masiado altas por la mayor￿a de la poblaci￿n. En nuestro trabajo estudiamos en quØ medida estas
dos observaciones estÆn relacionadas. En un experimento de intercambio de regalos nos pregun-
tamos si las compensaciones gerenciales in￿ uyen en las decisiones de esfuerzo de los trabajadores.
Comparamos las sesiones en las que el salario de los gerentes es informaci￿n pœblica con sesiones
de informaci￿n privada. Nuestros datos sugieren que los salarios de los gerentes estÆn negativa-
mente correlacionados con el esfuerzo de los trabajadores, en particular, despuØs de la reducci￿n
de salarios. La estrategia que maximiza bene￿cios para la empresa es la de comprimir los salarios
cuando Øste es informaci￿n pœblica
Palabras claves: salarios gerenciales, preferencias sociales, experimento de laboratorio, inter-
cambio de regalos, esfuerzo, recortes de personal
Clasi￿caci￿n JEL: C92, J33, M12, M52
21 Introduction
In times of increasing international competition, ￿rms demand employees to make concessions to
carry out necessary restructuring measures. These concessions can partly be resisted by the workers,
whose behavior at work can not be fully contracted upon. At the same time, excessive management
compensation may cause considerable damage to the willingness to contribute to cost savings on the
organizational level. This is particularly true if in times of downsizing, when workers are confronted
with wage cuts, the managerial compensation is rising. We analyze in a two-level gift-exchange
experiment if these two observations are interconnected.
In our experimental design we distinguish between a ￿rm￿ s owner and a manager. Thus, we
extend gift-exchange labor-market models to a more realistic hierarchical structure. In the ￿eld,
usually shareholders set the manager￿ s wage, while the workers￿wages are set by the manager. This
leads to a two-level principal-agent relationship: between the ￿rm and the manager on the ￿rst level
and between the manager and the workers on the second level.
We want to test, 1) if the workers￿e⁄ort is in￿ uenced by the observation of the managerial com-
pensation, 2) if executive pay is particularly salient during downsizing, and 3) if workers still exert
their e⁄ort in response to wage o⁄ers if the wage-setter (the manager) gets only a small part of the
bene￿ts generated by the workers. We contribute to several di⁄erent strands of the literature. Re-
garding questions 1 and 2, we analyze the importance of fairness considerations in labor markets in
general and their importance for the optimal incentive compensation of managers in particular. We
ask if fairness considerations are strong enough to justify consequences such as wage compression and
wage secrecy. Regarding question 3, we contribute to the discussion about the driving forces behind
gift-exchange and how robust the results of bilateral one-level gift-exchange experiments are when the
labor relationship is placed in a more complex and more realistic organizational hierarchy, comparing
the e⁄ort decisions of workers in the case when the manager decides their wage (and gets only a small
part of the revenue generated by the workers through their e⁄ort) with the case where the ￿rm￿ s owner
does it (and receives the biggest part of the revenue).
We ￿nd that manager￿ s wage in￿ uences negatively the e⁄ort decision of the workers, the higher the
manager￿ s wage the lower the e⁄ort of the workers, for a given own wage of the workers. We also ￿nd
that the e⁄ect of the manager￿ s wage is especially important during downsizing. The results are in line
3with the results of the exit survey1 where 65% of the workers states that the managerial compensation
had a decisive e⁄ect on their e⁄ort determination or was even their primary consideration. Regarding
question 3, we ￿nd that it does not exist signi￿cant di⁄erences in the e⁄ort decision of the workers
when the manager sets workers￿wage in comparison with the situation when the ￿rm￿ s owner decides
it; reciprocal preferences are not directed towards one particular member of the ￿rm, but towards the
￿rm as a whole.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we summarize related literature and
state our hypotheses. Section 3 presents our experimental design. Results are presented in section 4.
Based on the results, the paper concludes with a discussion in section 5.
2 Literature review and hypotheses
The traditional literature dealing with managerial compensation focuses on the problems of the
principal-agent relationship between a ￿rm owner and a manager which occurs given that managers
bear little ￿nancial costs if they pursue their own goals rather than maximize shareholders￿wealth.
Two typical standpoints can be identi￿ed. In the "optimal contracting approach" the aim is to op-
timize the compensation in regard to the incentive e⁄ects. The managerial compensation is seen as
an instrument to solve the moral hazard problem (Murphy, 1997). An alternative view on managerial
compensation is taken by the "managerial power approach", which seeks to reduce the moral hazard
problem through an e⁄ective corporate governance mechanism such as e⁄ective boards. Managerial
compensation is not only seen as an instrument to solve the principal-agent problem, but as part of
the agency problem itself, since in many cases it does not provide e¢ cient incentives but rents for the
managers (Bebchuck and Fried, 2003).
However, both views focus on the ￿rm￿ s owner - manager relationship without considering the
e⁄ects on the workers who might have social preferences regarding the managerial compensation.2
Labor relations in general are typically contractually incompletely regulated. In incomplete con-
tracts not all relevant aspects are comprehensively determined, since some important aspects are not
1A survey distributed when the experiment ￿nishes.
2An individual exhibits social preferences if he cares not only about the resources allocated to him but also about the
resources allocated to relevant reference agents. See Fehr and Fischbacher (2002).
4enforceable or not observable (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). This is true for the contracts of
workers and managers, while the importance of the incomplete part is typically increasing with the
hierarchy level of an employee, since the tasks of work get more complex.
The following graph shows how we connect the two principal-agent relationships ￿rm-manager
and manager-worker, which are traditionally analyzed separately. As described above, the managerial
compensation is usually seen only as an instrument to solve the incentive and moral hazard problem in
regard to the managers￿work (in particular the variable compensation). One of the responsibilities of
the managers is to ensure high workers￿e⁄ort. Following the e¢ ciency wage theory managers set the
workers￿wages to make them work more than the minimum required (which is indicated by the non-
contractible part of the workers￿e⁄ort ￿ NC). Additional to the in￿ uence of the own compensation,



















Figure 1: Ppal-agent relations and managerial compensation
3The e⁄ort is divided into two parts: the contractible part (C) (e.g. certain duties that can be inspected, working
time, etc), and the non-contractible part (NC). Part of NC is ex-post observable (NCO) and part of it is not (NCNO).
The latter is, in the case of managers, all forms of works and decisions which have in￿ uence on indices such as the share
quotation. The consequences of NCNO can not be captured with objective measures and can not be traced back to
individual decisions. Since workers￿e⁄ort can be more easily contracted upon than the managers￿e⁄ort, C has more
weight in the worker￿ s than in the manager￿ s e⁄ort bar. The ￿xed wage a⁄ects basically C, while the variable part of the
compensation a⁄ects NCO, while both ￿ ￿xed and variable compensations￿ a⁄ect NCNO. The variable compensation
consists of e.g. bonus, which is paid when the ￿rm can observe the work ex-post, and also options, which can be used to
motivate the manager to work more long term oriented ￿ something not possible to be measured accurately.
5It is widely accepted that, although e⁄ort at work is at least to some degree non-contractible,
workers are more likely to perform above any minimum requirements if they feel fairly treated and
have been paid a fair wage (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Fehr and G￿chter,
2000). In order to motivate employees to put forward an e¢ ciency-enhancing e⁄ort level the own com-
pensation is seen as the most important instrument. However, as recognized by theories of distributive
and procedural justice, employees￿motivation is not only a simple function of ￿nancial inducement
but it is also in￿ uenced by social comparisons and by the perception of causes and processes. As
theories of social comparisons suggest, perceived pay inequities could lead to unfavorable reactions
such as lower productivity and product quality, decreased employee morale, and increased turnover.
Moreover, the expectation that undesirable organizational outcomes will occur with greater vertical
inequity has received empirical support (Cowherd and Levine, 1992). Furthermore, the research on so-
cial comparison theory o⁄ers strong support for the tendency of individuals in organizations to engage
in upward social comparisons with senior managers in order to understand how well they are doing,
whether their compensation package is fair, and how equitably they are being treated (O￿Reilly, Wade
and Pollock, 2006). Therefore our ￿rst hypothesis is the following:
Hypothesis 1: The observation of the manager￿ s wage in￿uences workers￿e⁄ort decision.
It is commonly accepted that the broader public dislikes high managerial compensations. Data for
the fairness perceptions in Germany is available through the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) conducted
in 2005.4 While 54% of the population think that their personal income is fair, only 25% think that
way about the income of managers and 29% about the income level of the lowest-level employees.
Accordingly, managers earn too much and lowest-level employees earn too little in the eyes of the
majority. According to a Bloomberg￿ s survey done in February 2006, about 81% of Americans say
they think that the chief executives of large companies are overpaid, a percentage that changes little
with income level or political party a¢ liation.5
Gerlach et al. (2006) analyze the perceived fairness of layo⁄s and pay cuts in North America and
Germany when the CEO receives a bonus and when the CEO refuses to get a bonus. In North America
and Germany, fairness ratings of layo⁄s are very low if the CEO receives a bonus for cost-cutting and
4The SOEP is a representative panel survey of the resident population of Germany. The 2005 wave of the survey
includes 21.105 individuals from 11.453 households.
5Dash (2006). Bloomberg is the leading global provider of data, news and analytics.
6the acceptance of layo⁄s increases signi￿cantly if the bonus is refused. Surprisingly, the refusal of the
bonus payment improves fairness ratings twice as much in the United States as in Germany.6 Thus,
our second hypothesis stresses the importance of the perceptions of the manager￿ s wage in periods of
downsizing and ￿nancial restrictions.
Hypothesis 2: The e⁄ect of managerial compensation on workers￿e⁄ort is more signi￿cant after
pay cuts.
One of the main ￿ndings of bilateral gift-exchange experiments is that in an incomplete contracts
environment (e⁄ort is not contractible and not observable) usually a high percentage of the workers
reward higher wages with higher e⁄ort (Fehr et al., 1993). A vast amount of experimental studies of
bilateral work relations exists. E¢ ciency preferences and the positive forms of reciprocity and inequity
aversion are usually called for the explanation of gift-exchange behavior (above-minimum e⁄ort) in
response to above-minimum wages.7 However, more complex, multilateral work relations are not
deeply studied yet (exceptions are Abeler et al., 2006; Maximiano et al. 2006a, 2006b; Charness and
Kuhn, 2005). While Abeler et al. (2006) and Charness and Kuhn (2005) focus on horizontal fairness
considerations between workers on the same hierarchy level, there exists to our best knowledge no
experimental study which considers fairness e⁄ects in regard to managerial compensations.
Closely related to our experiment is the one in Charness and Kuhn (2005), although there are
several departures. Most importantly, we introduce a manager who sets workers￿wages in half of the
sessions and who is much more decisive for the ￿rm￿ s outcome than a single worker. Furthermore, our
￿rm employs in total four employees (three workers and one manager), while in their case they have a
￿rm with one owner and two workers.8 Moreover, we test for the e⁄ect of wage cuts, since we believe
that concerns about managerial compensation are more salient in times of downsizing.
An experimental study which distinguishes explicitly between a manager and a ￿rm￿ s owner is
Maximiano et al. (2006b). They report that the workers still reward higher wages with higher e⁄ort
levels, even when the manager who is responsible for setting the wage does not share the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts
at all. In contrast to our paper, the ￿rm￿ s owner in Maximiano et al. (2006b) cannot decide about
the manager￿ s wage and the manager does not contribute to the ￿rm￿ s revenue at all. Thus, fairness
6Gerlach et al. (2006). See Charness and Levine (2000) for similar results.
7See Maximiano et al. (2006b) for a discussion.
8We include vertical considerations while they have horizontal considerations (comparisons among the two workers).
7considerations regarding the managerial compensation are not tested for, while they are the focus of
our experiment.
Following the results in Maximiano et al. (2006b), our third hypothesis refers to the di⁄erence in
workers￿e⁄ort when it is the ￿rm￿ s owner or the manager who decides their wages.9
Hypothesis 3: The workers￿ e⁄ort choices do not di⁄er if the manager or the ￿rm￿ s owner is
setting the workers￿wages.
3 The experiment
The experiment is programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects
receive the instructions on paper.10 To ensure that subjects understood the experiment, all subjects
have to answer a number of control questions about the instructions, before the experiment starts.
At the beginning of each session, students are randomly divided into three groups: workers, ￿rm￿ s
owners, and managers. Each subject stays in the assigned role for the duration of the session. In each
session 30 periods are played under stranger matching, i.e. after each round subjects are re-matched,
and the probability of playing with exactly the same partners consecutively is zero.11
Two treatment changes between the sessions and one treatment change within the sessions are
implemented:
1) The information on the managers￿wages is changed between private (PrW hereafter) and public
(PuW hereafter), with the private information sessions as the reference case to measure the in￿ uence of
the perception of managerial compensation on workers￿e⁄ort. In PuW-sessions, workers are informed
about the manager￿ s wage, while in the PrW-sessions they are not.
2) In half of the sessions, the ￿rm determines the workers￿wages (FD hereafter), in the other half
the manager is the responsible for setting the workers￿wage (MD hereafter). We test for di⁄erences
between the wage setting of ￿rm￿ s owners and managers, and for the e⁄ects on workers￿e⁄ort decisions.
9The case where the ￿rm￿ s owner and the manager are the same person is observed often in family-owned companies,
in which the "main shareholder" and the CEO are the same person, while the case of separation of power ￿ the ￿rm￿ s
owner and the manager are di⁄erent persons￿ is more frequent in publicly owned companies.
10Instructions for one of the sessions can be found in Appendix 2.
11The objective of changing partners is to minimize reputation e⁄ects.
83) Within a session, an overall cut in endowment is established after round 15.12 With this change
we want to see how ￿rms divide the cut in the endowment ￿ the tokens he has to pay salaries￿ between
the wage of the more decisive manager and the wages of the less decisive workers. Moreover, we want
to check if the managerial compensation is more in￿ uential for the workers in times of downsizing.
Table 1 summarizes the information on our treatments.13
Sessions Workers' wage set by Managers' wage Endowment
1-2   PuW/MD Manager Public 15 LE / 10 LE
3-4   PrW/MD Manager Private 15 LE / 10 LE
5-6   PuW/FD Firm’s Owner Public 15 LE / 10 LE
7-8   PrW/FD Firm’s Owner Private 15 LE / 10 LE
Table 1: Treatment changes
Each period consists of four stages. In the ￿rst stage, the ￿rm￿ s owner decides which part of
the initial endowment (N) will be paid as a ￿xed wage wm to the manager, wm should be integers,
wm 2 f0;1;2;:::;Ng. In the second stage, the manager in MD-sessions and the ￿rm in FD-sessions
decides how much of the remaining endowment will be used to pay uniform wages to the three workers
(ww).14 In the third stage, managers and workers decide how hard they will work for the ￿rm. The
workers and managers receive no direct bene￿t from providing costly e⁄ort, while the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t
depends critically on the e⁄ort levels chosen. In the fourth stage the workers are informed about the
total pro￿t and their own earnings, and the manager and the ￿rm￿ s owner are informed about the
e⁄ort of each worker and their own earnings.
In the ￿rst stage we have a traditional principal-agent relationship in an incomplete-contract
environment, where the manager￿ s e⁄ort choice is a reaction to the wage assigned to him by the
￿rm, and the person who chooses the manager￿ s wage is the same person that pays it. In the second
stage, the manager￿ s considerations might di⁄er from those of a principal, who receives the total pro￿t
12In the instruction subjects are told that: "Over the course of the session changes in the economic situation (indicated
by the initial endowment) of the ￿rm might occur, which will be communicated to you when they occur".
13PuW refers to public information sessions, PrW refers to private information sessions, MD refers to the sessions
where the managers decides the workers￿wages, FD refers to the sessions where the ￿rm￿s owner decides the workers￿
wages, and LE refers to laboratory euros.
14sw should also be integers.
9produced by the workers, since the manager does not get the total pro￿t provided by the workers (he
gets only 20% as a bonus if the workers generate a positive pro￿t15) and does not have to bear the
costs of the salary.16
The revenue (depending on di⁄erent levels of responsibility and productivity) provided by the
workers and the manager and the costs of e⁄ort is given by the following table.





0 0 0 0
1 0.1 2 6
2 0.3 3.3 10
3 0.6 4 12
Table 2: Revenues and costs of e⁄ort in LE
The workers are not aware of the magnitude of the productivity di⁄erences between workers and
manager, but they are informed that the manager is much more productive than a worker.17 Workers
neither know the initial endowment of the ￿rm￿ s owner.18
The payo⁄s (based on Charness and Kuhn, 2005) are chosen to generate non-zero e⁄ort levels from
the majority of workers and managers, to embody large productivity di⁄erences between workers and
the manager, and to allow workers and the manager to impose high costs on ￿rms by choosing e⁄ort
level 0. The payo⁄s for each participant are calculated in the following way19:
Firm0s payo￿ = Initial Endowment + Total Revenue ￿ Total Salaries
Manager0s payo￿ = Manager0s Wage + Bonus ￿ Cost of E￿ort
15The pro￿t generated by the workers is de￿ned as the sum of the revenue provided by them (from table 2) minus the
wages they are paid.
16In real ￿rms, managers receive part of the revenues of the ￿rms through the variable part of their compensation (e.g.
shares or stock options).
17The reason for this is to approximate real world labor markets in which workers know that the manager is much more
decisive for the overall outcome, but can not determine their true relative value to the employer. We followed Charness
and Kuhn (2005) ￿ s idea that workers do not know the exact di⁄erence of his own productivity and his co-worker￿ s
productivity.
18We didn￿ t give the information about the initial endowment of the ￿rm￿ s owner, following Charness and Kuhn (2005),
to avoid the possibility that the workers can deduce the wage paid to the manager in the PrW-sessions.
19These formulas are explained below.
10Worker0s payo￿ = Worker0s Wage ￿ Cost of E￿ort
where the Initial Endowment is 15 lab euros in the ￿rst 15 periods and 10 lab euros in the last 15
periods.20 Total Revenue is the sum of the revenue generated by each of the workers and by the
manager (see table 2). Total Salaries consist of three times the uniform worker￿ s wage (ww), plus the
￿xed salary for the manager (wm) plus the bonus to the manager. The Bonus is 20% of the bene￿t
generated by the workers, which is the revenue provided by the workers minus the wages assigned to
them, as long as this di⁄erence is positive. Through the bonus, the workers￿e⁄ort is directly connected
to the managerial compensation. If the bene￿t generated by the workers is zero or negative, then the
bonus is 0.
At the end of a session, all participants are paid privately. Earnings accumulate over the course
of the session, and are then converted from lab euros to real euros with a conversion rate of 5 LE = 1
e for the workers and the managers and 20 LE = 1 e for the ￿rm￿ s owners.
Additionally, at the end of the 30 rounds, we administered a survey to the participants. In the
survey, workers were asked ￿ among other questions￿ "To what extent did you consider the managers￿
wage when deciding how much e⁄ort to supply?"21 The ￿rms and the managers were asked for their
considerations when they were setting the wages.
4 Results
The experiment was conducted at Universitat Aut￿noma de Barcelona, from November 2006 to March
2007. Almost all subjects were undergraduate students.22 First of all, we present the number of
subjects that participated in the experiment and their average earnings, in table 3. Then, we present
the average wages and e⁄ort levels by period. Next, we show results related to Hypotheses 1 and 2.
It includes estimations where the dependent variable is the e⁄ort level chosen by workers, and the
set of explanatory variables include the manager￿ s wage. Then, the average wages by treatment are
presented, followed by the relation between wage and e⁄ort. The main results are numbered.
20This change in the endowment tries to simulate a crisis in the ￿rm, and it is presented as "￿nancial problems" to
the subjects.
21This question was included in the survey only in the PuW-sessions. In formulating it we followed Charness and
Kuhn (2005).
22We had only one participant that was not an undergraduate student, but an employee of the university.
11In the following table we have the number of subjects that participated in the 8 sessions of the
experiment and the average earnings, in euros, including the show-up fee.
N Min Max Average
Firm's owners 32 11.01 30.59 22.21
Managers 32 25.04 48.36 34.06
Workers 96 7.28 16.24 12.73
All 160 7.28 48.36 18.89
Table 3: Nr of subjects and avg earnings in e
The average ￿rms￿earning is 22.21 e. This number is 25.22 and 19.19 e in the FD- and MD-
sessions respectively. These numbers lead us to our ￿rst result below. When the managers￿wage is
public information, the ￿rms￿average earning is 21.96 e and when this information is private, their
average earning is 22.46 e.
Result 1: The ￿rms￿ earnings are higher when the ￿rm￿ s owners are the ones who decide the
workers￿ wage, than when the managers decide wages.
In ￿gure 2 we have plott the average wages and e⁄ort levels by period.23 We observe a decrease
in e⁄orts and wages over time, for both workers and managers.24 The period e⁄ect is particularly
observable in the e⁄orts. Nevertheless, the workers￿wage exhibit a di⁄erence between part I (periods
1-15) and part II (periods 16-30), but not a period e⁄ect. Something similar occurs with the managers￿
wage, it exists a period e⁄ect in part I, then a decrease after the endowment cut in period 15 and in
23Recall that after period 15 we have a cut in the endowment of the ￿rm￿ s owner, that goes from 15 LE to 10 LE.
24This could be caused by the type of matching we have in the experiment: we change partners every period. G￿chter
and Fehr (2002) compare a one shot-treatment (change partners) with a repeated interactions-treatment (play with the
same partners) and they ￿nd that e⁄orts are higher (and increasing) when they play with the same partner. The same
pattern is found in public good experiments.

























































Workers' effort Managers' effort
Workers' wage Managers' wage
Figure 2: Average wages and e⁄ort levels by period
The estimations reported in table 4 give an answer to the key question whether the perception of the
managerial compensation has an impact on the workers￿e⁄ort choices in public sessions (Hypotheses
1 and 2). The dependent variable is the workers￿e⁄ort choice, a variable that takes the value 0, 1, 2,
or 3. Since the repetition of observations of the subjects has to be taken into account, we estimated
a panel data model and a model clustering on subjects. The ￿rst methodology is more powerful and
the second one more conservative. With the panel data we reduce the probability of error type II (not
rejecting a false null hypothesis) while with the clustering approach we reduce the probability of error
type I (rejecting a true null hypothesis). These estimations can be seen as bounds of what is really in
the data.
We report the coe¢ cient of the variable Manager￿ s wage of the estimations, its standard error,
the number of groups or clusters (for the panel data and the clustering method, respectively), and the
signi￿cance level of the estimation. We control for each worker￿ s wage, for the period, the sex, the
age, the ￿eld of study, and we use a dummy variable for the person choosing the workers￿wages (￿rm
or manager).
For workers￿wages equal 2 and 3 LE, two of the three most frequently assigned wages, there is a
signi￿cant negative impact of the managerial compensation. When the workers are paid a positive but
small wage (1 LE) after the cut in the endowment, the managerial compensation is salient, although it
13is not signi￿cant before this cut. The results ￿ summarized in Result 2￿ are in line with the results
of the exit survey. 65% of the workers in the public sessions stated that the managerial compensation
had a decisive e⁄ect on their e⁄ort determination or was even their primary consideration.
Coefficient Std error Nr groups Prob>chi2 Coefficient Std error Nr groups Prob>chi2 Coefficient Std error Nr groups Prob>chi2
Worker's wage = 0 0.0008 0.0080 45 0.0350 -0.0064 0.0123 27 0.1813 -0.0041 0.0109 45 0.0224
Worker's wage = 1 -0.0146 0.0135 48 0.0009 -0.0083 0.0199 46 0.0020 -0.0478** 0.0208 48 0.0062
Worker's wage = 2 -0.0703*** 0.0165 48 0.0000 -0.0783*** 0.0198 48 0.0000 -0.1025** 0.0415 47 0.0000
Worker's wage = 3 -0.1111*** 0.0419 48 0.0007 -0.1131*** 0.0426 48 0.0005 -0.7094*** 0.2291 21 0.0078
Worker's wage = 4 -0.0996 0.1207 40 0.0998 -0.0996 0.1207 40 0.0998
Worker's wage = 5
*** significant at 1% level Prob > chi2  gives the level of significance of the estimation
** significant at 5% level
Coefficient Std error Nr clusters Prob>F Coefficient Std error Nr clusters Prob>F Coefficient Std error Nr clusters Prob>F
Worker's wage = 0 0.0064 0.0080 45 0.7205 -0.0064 0.0106 27 0.3321 0.0060 0.0096 45 0.5184
Worker's wage = 1 -0.0264 0.0241 48 0.0002 -0.0076 0.0218 46 0.0019 -0.0792** 0.0381 48 0.0702
Worker's wage = 2 -0.0933*** 0.0261 48 0.0000 -0.0971*** 0.0321 48 0.0000 -0.0784 0.0629 47 0.0000
Worker's wage = 3 -0.1612** 0.0673 48 0.0000 -0.1426** 0.0682 48 0.0013 -0.8112*** 0.2143 21 0.0109
Worker's wage = 4 -0.0912 0.1279 40 0.0313 -0.0912 0.1279 40 0.0313
Worker's wage = 5
*** significant at 1% level Prob > F  gives the level of significance of the estimation
** significant at 5% level
Periods 1 - 30
Periods 1 - 30 Part I (Periods 1 - 15) Part II (Periods 16 - 30)




In most of the estimations we have a signi￿cant period e⁄ect with decreasing e⁄ort through the
course of the session. There is also a signi￿cant age and gender e⁄ect: higher age implies higher levels
of e⁄ort and women choose higher levels of e⁄ort than men.
Result 2: Workers￿e⁄ort decisions are negatively correlated with the manager￿ s wage, especially
after wage cuts.
In the following paragraphs, we present the results related with average wages, the ratio between
wages, and its relation with the ￿rm￿ s earnings. In table 5 we show the average workers￿and managers￿
wages and the ratio between them.
In FD-sessions the workers￿ wage is higher than in MD-sessions (p-value=0.000).25 Probably
the workers￿wages in MD-sessions would be higher if the managers￿scope to pay wages would not
25Either following a t-test or a Mann-Whitney U test. The comparison is done at the ￿rm level, therefore the number
of observations is equal to the number of ￿rms.
14be restricted by partly very high managerial compensations. Since the ￿rms are free to divide the
endowment between the manager and the workers in the FD-sessions, they did not have such a
restriction, and chose higher workers￿ wages. The di⁄erence in the average wage of the workers
between the private and the public sessions is not statistically signi￿cant.26
All periods Private Public Group Total Private Public Group Total Private Public Group Total
FD 2.06 1.99 2.03 4.63 4.41 4.52 2.25 2.22 2.23
MD 1.53 1.45 1.49 6.43 5.65 6.04 4.19 3.90 4.05
Group Total 1.80 1.72 1.76 5.53 5.03 5.28 3.08 2.93 3.00
Part I
FD 2.44 2.38 2.41 5.56 5.20 5.38 2.28 2.18 2.23
MD 1.83 1.88 1.86 8.02 6.65 7.33 4.37 3.53 3.95
Group Total 2.14 2.13 2.14 6.79 5.93 6.36 3.18 2.78 2.98
Part II
FD 1.68 1.59 1.64 3.71 3.63 3.67 2.20 2.28 2.24
MD 1.23 1.01 1.12 4.84 4.64 4.74 3.93 4.60 4.23
Group Total 1.46 1.30 1.38 4.28 4.13 4.20 2.93 3.18 3.05
Managers' wage / Workers' wage Workers' wage Managers' wage
Table 5: Average wages
Managers￿wages are higher in PrW- than in PuW-sessions,27 with the exception of part II in FD-
sessions. The ￿rm￿ s owners thus seem to anticipate some negative consequences of high managerial
wages on the workers￿e⁄ort. Furthermore, the managers￿wages are higher in the MD- than in the
FD-sessions.28 There are two possible explanations for that. One is that paying more to the manager,
the ￿rm￿ s owner could control the wage of the workers, because the workers￿wage can only be one
third of the remaining tokens (initial endowment minus manager￿ s wage). The second reason is that
the ￿rm￿ s owner wanted to pay higher salaries in this case because managers in the MD-sessions have
more responsibility, since they have to choose the salary of the workers.
The managers￿ /workers￿wage ratio is higher in PrW- than in PuW-sessions if we consider the 30
periods together. This pattern is also observed in part I, but not in part II. When the ￿rms have a
￿nancial restriction, they decrease the ratio in PrW-sessions, but they increase it in PuW-sessions.
The latter is due to the more signi￿cant decrease in the workers￿wages than in the managers￿wage.
This is especially notable in the MD-sessions. In these cases, managers received a lower salary and
26Neither following a t-test or a Mann-Whitney U test.
27The p-values for the "All periods" comparison are 0.007 and 0.006 for "Group total", and 0.306 and 0.091 in
FD-sessions, and 0.007 and 0.014 in MD-sessions. The ￿rst p-values correspond to t-tests and the second values to
Mann-Whitney U tests.
28The p-value for the comparison of 4.52 and 6.04 is 0.000 with both methods of comparison.
15chose a lower salary also for the three workers, but this decrease was larger than the decrease they
have experienced in their own wage. On the other hand, in the FD-sessions, the ￿rm￿ s owners divided
the ￿nancial problem more equally among the four employees. A possible reason for the signi￿cantly
lower wage di⁄erentials in FD-sessions might be that the ￿rms are more inequity-averse when they
feel responsible for the income distribution. Since they did not feel completely responsible for unequal
distributions in MD-sessions, they might care more about their own pro￿t than about distribution
e⁄ects.
Result 3: The manager￿ s wage as well as the ratio managers￿wage/workers￿wage is higher in
PrW- than in PuW-sessions. The ratio is lower in FD- than in MD-sessions.
Although the wage di⁄erentials vary considerably between the FD- and MD-treatments, the overall
average wage ratio is notable. On average in all eight sessions, the managers are paid three times more
than the workers, which equals exactly the productivity ratio between managers and workers.
Regarding the optimal wage ratio, ￿gure 3 shows that with a ratio between 1.5 and 2 the ￿rm
obtains the highest pro￿ts in both part I and part II.29 For higher wage ratios, the ￿rms￿pro￿t gets
lower. There may be two reasons for that: the incentive e⁄ect on the managers￿e⁄ort is diminishing














































Freq Part I Freq Part II Firms' earng Part I Firms' earng Part II
Figure 3: Wage ratio and ￿rm￿ s earnings
29In ￿gure 4 the ￿rms￿earnings are measured in LE.
16Result 4: The ￿rms￿average earnings increases with the managers￿ /workers￿wage ratio up to a
ratio equal 2, and then it decreases for higher ratios.
Analyzing if there exists a di⁄erence between the workers￿e⁄ort in private and public sessions,
we ￿nd that the di⁄erence is not statistically signi￿cant.30 The same happens with the managerial
e⁄ort.31
Next, we show the relation between wages and e⁄ort, and relate it with Hypothesis 3. Figures 4
and 5 indicate that there is a robust positive relation between own wage and e⁄ort for workers ￿ with
the exception of the one observation when the salary of the workers is 5 LE￿ and in a weaker manner














































































Figure 5: Average managers￿e⁄ort
Regarding the comparison of workers￿e⁄ort in MD- and FD-sessions, two observations can be
made. In the public sessions, the e⁄ort decisions in the MD- and FD-treatment dependent on the own
wage are remarkably similar. Thus, with public information the gift-exchange holds even when the
wage-setter in MD-sessions does not receive the full revenue provided by the workers (as predicted
by Hypothesis 3). When comparing the private FD- and MD-sessions, we can ￿nd that the e⁄ort
for the same wage level is higher in FD-sessions. In this case, the gift-exchange is stronger when the
30p-value=0.666 in the the t-test and p-value=0.676 in the Mann-Whitney U test.
31The corresponding numbers can be observed in table A1 in Appendix 1.
32The managers￿e⁄ort reaches a maximum for intermediate compensations (6 LE) and decreases for very high com-
pensations. It seems that the managers prefer a reasonable relation between their wages and the workers￿wages. When
the income inequality goes beyond a certain level, the managers choose lower e⁄ort levels.
17wage-setter is also the receiver of the whole gift.33
Result 5: There exists a strong positive relation between own wage and e⁄ort levels for workers,
i.e. the higher the own wage the more e⁄ort34, while the managers￿e⁄ort reaches a maximum for
middle wages and then decreases for very high wages.35
In the case of managers the gift exchange seems to work only until a certain level of wage. It may
be explained by inequity aversion: inequity averse managers know that they will earn much more than
the workers and therefore did not feel grateful to the ￿rms and then choose lower levels of e⁄ort.
Table 6 shows the ratio between e⁄ort and wages for workers and managers. We observe that the
ratio for managers increases from part I to part II. Although the level of e⁄ort decreased from part I
to part II, the wages decrease more, and this yields a higher e⁄ort-wage ratio. They know that the
￿rm has 10 LE instead of 15 LE as endowment, and although they wage decrease almost in one third,
they e⁄ort only decreases 19% (on average). The exact variations are in table 2 in Appendix 1.
All periods Private Public Group Total Private Public Group Total
Part I
FD 0.61 0.45 0.53 0.37 0.33 0.35
MD 0.42 0.54 0.48 0.16 0.19 0.17
Group Total 0.53 0.49 0.51 0.25 0.25 0.25
Part II
FD 0.55 0.48 0.52 0.51 0.39 0.45
MD 0.37 0.56 0.46 0.18 0.22 0.20
Group Total 0.48 0.51 0.49 0.32 0.29 0.31
Average workers ratio effort/wage Average managers ratio effort/wage
Table 6: Ratio e⁄ort/wage in parts I and II
In the case of the workers the ratio e⁄ort/wage decreases in the second part with private informa-
tion, but increases with public information. Our interpretation is that if workers don￿ t get information
about the manager￿ s wage, they cannot be sure about it, and they might guess that the manager￿ s
33In the exit survey the workers were asked the reason why they chose an e⁄ort level higher than 0. In MD-sessions,
37% answered that they wanted to increase the chance that the manager gets a bonus, 27% wanted to increase the pro￿t
of the ￿rm￿ s owner, and the remaining 36% stated that they either never chose positive e⁄ort levels or did focus neither
on the manager, nor on the ￿rm. The fact that the manager sets the workers￿wages seems to be more important than
the fact that the salary is paid out of the ￿rm￿ s endowment. The percentages in the FD-sessions are 8%, 69%, and 23%.
34The point corresponding to wage=5 LE is due to only one observation.
35Except in the MD/PrW-treatment.
18wage was not decreasing. But when there is an open communication policy, there are not such spec-
ulations, and the workers can observe in most of the time that the burden of the wage cut was split
more or less equally. When the cost of the wage cuts is fairly distributed, the acceptance of wage cuts
is higher.
Result 6: The ratio e⁄ort/wage for the workers decreases from part I to part II with private
information, but increases with public information.
The ratio for workers is higher in PuW than in PrW in the MD-sessions, and the opposite is
observed in FD-sessions. When the manager decides workers￿wage it has a positive e⁄ect to disclose
the managerial compensation.
The results of the experiment con￿rm our ￿rst two hypotheses, i.e. the e⁄ort decision of the
workers is a⁄ected by the manager￿ s wage, especially after wage cuts. The ￿rms￿pro￿ts, the workers￿
wages, and the workers￿and managers￿average e⁄orts are higher in FD-sessions, while the average
managerial wage is lower. For the same workers￿wages, the average workers￿e⁄ort is remarkably
similar in the public FD- and MD-sessions. Thus, with public managerial compensation, the gift-
exchange holds even when the wage-setter does not receive the full revenue provided by the workers
as predicted by Hypothesis 3. With private managers￿wages on the other side, the workers￿e⁄ort is
higher in FD-sessions than in MD-sessions (in contrast to Hypothesis 3). Regarding the question if
the managerial compensation should be disclosed, the results are ambiguous. While the pro￿ts are
higher with disclosed managerial compensation in MD-sessions, the opposite holds in FD-sessions.
5 Discussion
Anecdotal evidence and data from opinion polls suggest that excessive management compensation not
only contradicts the fairness preferences of a majority of the population but also causes considerable
damage to workers￿willingness to accept cost savings on the organizational level. The ￿rst objective of
this paper was to test if workers￿e⁄ort is in￿ uenced by the observation of the managerial compensation,
and if executive pay is particularly important during downsizing. Our ￿rst hypothesis was that the
observation of the manager￿ s wage in￿ uences workers￿e⁄ort decision, and the second hypothesis was
that the managerial compensation is particularly salient after pay cuts. Our experimental results
19con￿rm our ￿rst two hypotheses: workers￿e⁄ort decisions are negatively correlated with the manager￿ s
wage, especially after wage cuts (Result 2).
Another objective was to check if these e⁄ects were strong enough to justify consequences such as
wage compression or wage secrecy. We present experimental evidence that wage compression36 is in
fact pro￿t maximizing when labor relations are contractually incompletely regulated. It seems that be-
side the positive incentive e⁄ect of high managerial compensations regarding the e⁄ort of the manager,
a rising inequality can cause opposed e⁄ects because of workers￿fairness considerations. Knowledge
about the interplay of the two e⁄ects is very important when creating an e¢ cient compensation policy
in ￿rms. A bene￿cial pay policy will always depend on the relative relevance of these two e⁄ects.
In particular, in times of downsizing a sensitive managerial wage setting and a good communication
strategy seem appropriate. Regardless of the negative e⁄ects of high managerial wages, the opportu-
nity to observe the managerial compensation had a positive impact on workers￿e⁄ort choices, when
the managers set the workers￿wages. Under these realistic circumstances, it seems that to disclose
managerial wages is a pro￿t-maximizing strategy. This is of importance in countries which leave the
decision whether to disclose the managerial compensation to the shareholders. To ensure the positive
e⁄ects, the disclosure should be integrated in a pro-active strategy, in which also the reasoning behind
the compensation decision is communicated to the sta⁄.
Our last aim was to test if workers still exert their e⁄ort in response to wage o⁄ers if the wage-setter
gets only a small part of the bene￿ts generated by the workers. Our third hypothesis was that workers￿
e⁄ort choices do not di⁄er if the manager or the ￿rm is setting workers￿wages. We found evidence
that workers￿motivation to reciprocate does not vanish in ￿rms with di⁄use ownership stock. It seems
that gift-exchange cannot be explained fully with intention-based reciprocal preferences towards the
￿rm￿ s owner, but with social norms which require some kind of e⁄ort in response to positive wage
o⁄ers. To put this di⁄erently, reciprocal preferences are not directed towards one particular member
of the ￿rm, but towards the ￿rm as a whole.
36Refering to the ratio manager￿ s wage/workers￿wage.
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226 Appendix 1
All periods Private Public Group Total Private Public Group Total
FD 1.21 0.92 1.06 1.98 1.57 1.77
MD 0.62 0.79 0.70 1.07 1.15 1.11
Group Total 0.91 0.85 0.88 1.52 1.36 1.44
Average workers effort Average managers effort
Table A1: Average e⁄ort levels
Evolution of wages from Part I to Part II
Private Public Private Public
FD -31% -33% -33% -30%
MD -33% -46% -40% -30%
Group Total -32% -39% -37% -30%
Evolution of effort from Part I to Part II
Private Public Private Public
FD -38% -29% -9% -20%
MD -40% -44% -32% -19%
Group Total -39% -36% -18% -19%
Evolution of ratio effort/wage
Private Public Private Public
FD -10% 7% 37% 15%
MD -11% 5% 13% 16%




Table A2: Evolution of wages, e⁄ort and ratio
237 Appendix 2: Instructions PuW/MD - Sessions
Instructions for all Participants
Thank you for coming to this experiment. You will be paid 3 euros for participating in this
experiment, plus the tokens you earn, which accumulate over the course of the session, converted
into euros. At the end of the session you will be privately paid. From now on, no communication is
allowed. After reading these instructions carefully, please raise your hand if you have any question.
There are three types of participants in this experiment: Firm￿ s owner (which we call simply ￿rm),
worker, and manager. You have been randomly assigned a type corresponding to the card you received
at the entrance. You will have that same type for the whole experiment. The experiment consists of
30 periods. In each period, each ￿rm￿ s owner will be grouped with three workers and one manager.
Firm, manager and workers are randomly re-matched every period. Each period consists of four steps,
which will be described in the following.
Step 1: The account of the ￿rm￿ s owner will be credited with a certain amount N of tokens. The
￿rm￿ s owner decides individually how much to pay to the manager (Sm). Wages can not exceed the
total amount assigned to the ￿rm; wages are restricted to be in whole tokens, e.g. 0 tokens, 1 token,
2 tokens, etc.
Step 2: The manager observers the wage paid to him/her and the remaining endowment (RE)
he/she can use to pay wages to the workers (RE = N ￿Sm). Then the manager decides how much to
pay to the workers. The three workers get the same wage; wages are restricted to be in whole tokens,
e.g. 0 tokens, 1 token, 2 tokens etc; wages can not exceed the remaining endowment RE.
Step 3: After the workers observe the wage assigned, workers and managers choose a level of
e⁄ort from 4 feasible levels. Each e⁄ort level has di⁄erent costs for workers and manager and implies
di⁄erent revenues for the ￿rm. Workers and manager have the same cost of e⁄ort, while the revenue
provided by the manager is much higher than the revenue provided by the workers. The three workers
are equally productive.
The payo⁄s for each participant are calculated in the following way:
24The ￿rm￿ s pro￿t is equal to the initial endowment (N) plus the pro￿t generated by the manager
plus 80% of the pro￿t generated by the workers as long as this is positive. The pro￿t generated by the
manager is equal to the revenue provided by him minus the salary paid to him. The pro￿t generated
by the workers is the sum of the revenues generated by them minus the salaries paid to them. When
the pro￿t generated by the workers is negative, the ￿rm has to bear 100% of these costs.
Thus, if the workers￿pro￿t is > 0 :
Firm0s payo￿ = N + Pro￿t Manager + 0:8 ￿ Pro￿t Workers
And if the workers￿pro￿t is < 0 :
Firm0s payo￿ = N + Pro￿t Manager + (negative) Pro￿t Workers
Each manager receives the wage assigned and the bonus (20% of the pro￿ts: revenue provided by
the workers minus the wages assigned to the workers, as long as this di⁄erence is positive), less the
cost of the e⁄ort level chosen.
When the workers￿pro￿t is > 0 :
Manager0s payo￿ = Manager0s Wage + 0:2 ￿ Pro￿t Workers ￿ Cost of E￿ort
When the workers￿pro￿t is < 0 :
Manager0s payo￿ = Manager0s Wage ￿ Cost of E￿ort
Each worker receives the wage assigned, less the cost of the e⁄ort level chosen.
Worker0s payo￿ = Worker0s Wage ￿ Cost of E￿ort
Step 4: The participants are informed about the decisions in the following way:
￿ Firms are informed about the wage paid to the workers, about each worker￿ s and manager￿ s
choice of e⁄ort, the corresponding revenues and about his/her own resulting earnings.
￿ Managers are informed about each worker￿ s revenue and about his/her total earnings.
￿ Workers are informed about the total revenue provided (by workers and manager) and about
their individual total earnings.
25After step 4, the period is over. At the end of period 30, you will be paid 3 euros for participating
in this experiment, plus the tokens in your account at that time converted into euros.
Over the course of the session, changes in the economic situation (indicated by the initial endow-
ment) of the ￿rm might occur, which will be communicated to you when they occur.
Instructions for Firms
Your role in this experiment is: ￿rm￿ s owner. You will keep this role for the whole experiment.
You will be matched every period with one manager and three workers.
At the beginning of each period, your account will be credited with 15 tokens. You decide what
wage to o⁄er to the manager. Wages can not exceed your 15 tokens endowment, and wages are
restricted to be in whole tokens, e.g. 0 tokens, 1 token, 2 tokens etc. The manager will be informed
about his/her wage and will then decide what wages to o⁄er to the workers out of the remaining
endowment. After the manager and the workers have been informed about their wages, (and after
the workers are informed also about the manager￿ s wage) they will choose a level of e⁄ort. The more
e⁄ort supplied, the more revenues you earn. But e⁄ort is costly to the workers and the manager.
In the following table you can see the costs of the e⁄ort levels that the workers and the manager
can choose, and the revenues they provide. The manager sees the same table as you, whereas workers
only see the column re￿ ecting costs and revenues for them.





0 0 0 0
1 0.1 2 6
2 0.3 3.3 10
3 0.6 4 12
￿ Zero e⁄ort level by either worker or the manager, means zero e⁄ort cost to both of them and no
revenue.
￿ E⁄ort level 1 by a worker generates revenues of 2 tokens, while e⁄ort level 1 by a manager
generates revenues of 6 tokens. It costs 0.1 tokens to the workers and the manager.
￿ E⁄ort level 2 by a worker generates revenues of 3.3 tokens, while e⁄ort level 2 by a manager
generates revenues of 10 tokens. It costs 0.3 tokens to the workers and to the manager.
26￿ E⁄ort level 3 by a worker generates revenues of 4 tokens, while e⁄ort level 3 by a manager
generates revenues of 12 tokens. It costs 0.6 tokens.
Your earnings will be the sum of the earnings in the 30 periods of the experiment converted into
euros plus 3e for showing up. The conversion rate for your earnings is: 20 tokens = 1e, i.e. each
token is worth 0.05e.
Please raise your hand, if you have any question.
Instructions for Managers
Your role in this experiment is: manager. You will keep this role for the whole experiment. You
will be matched every period with one ￿rm￿ s owner and three workers.
At the beginning of each period the ￿rm￿ s owner￿ s account will be credited with 15 tokens and
he/she should decide your wage (Sm). You will be informed about your wage and the remaining
endowment (RE) you can use to pay wages to the workers (RE = 15 ￿Sm). Then, you should decide
how much to pay to the workers. The three workers get the same wage; wages are restricted to be in
whole tokens, e.g. 0 tokens, 1 token, 2 tokens etc; wages can not exceed the remaining endowment
RE.
Then, you should choose a level of e⁄ort. The workers will do the same, after receiving the
information about their own and your wage. Each e⁄ort level has di⁄erent costs for you and the
workers and implies di⁄erent revenues. In the following table, you can see the costs of the e⁄ort levels
and the revenues they provide.





0 0 0 0
1 0.1 2 6
2 0.3 3.3 10
3 0.6 4 12
It means, if you choose:
￿ zero e⁄ort level, it implies zero cost to you and no revenue,
￿ e⁄ort level 1, it implies a cost of 0.1 tokens to you and a revenue of 6 tokens,
￿ e⁄ort level 2, it implies a cost of 0.3 tokens to you and it generates a revenues of 10 tokens,
27￿ e⁄ort level 3, it implies a cost of 0.6 tokens to you and it generates revenues of 12 tokens.
It means that the higher the level of e⁄ort, the higher the revenue for the ￿rm and the higher the
cost for you.
The workers will only observe the columns corresponding with their cost and revenue provided by
them. If a workers chooses:
￿ zero e⁄ort level, it implies zero cost to him/her and no revenue,
￿ e⁄ort level 1, it implies a cost of 0.1 tokens to him/her and a revenue of 2 tokens,
￿ e⁄ort level 2, it implies a cost of 0.3 tokens to him/her and it generates a revenues of 3.3 tokens,
￿ e⁄ort level 3, it implies a cost of 0.6 tokens to him/her and it generates revenues of 4 tokens.
Your earnings will be the sum of the earnings in the 30 periods of the experiment converted into
euros plus 3e for showing up. The conversion rate for your earnings (and the workers￿earnings) is: 5
tokens = 1e, i.e. each token is worth 0.20e.
Please raise your hand, if you have any question.
Instructions for Workers
Your role in this experiment is: worker. You will keep this role for the whole experiment. You will
be matched every period with one ￿rm￿ s owner, one manager and two workers.
At the beginning of each period the ￿rm￿ s owner￿ s account will be credited with N tokens and
he/she should decide your wage (Sm). The manager will be informed about his/her wage and the
remaining endowment (RE) he/she can use to pay wages to the workers (RE = N ￿Sm). Then, the
manager should decide how much to pay to the workers. The three workers get the same wage; wages
are restricted to be in whole tokens, e.g. 0 tokens, 1 token, 2 tokens etc; wages can not exceed the
remaining endowment RE. The manager is not obliged to choose a wage higher than 0 tokens.
Then, after knowing your wage, you should choose a level of e⁄ort. The manager and the other two
workers will do the same. Each e⁄ort level has di⁄erent costs for you and implies di⁄erent revenues.
In the following table, you can see the costs of the e⁄ort levels and the revenues they provide.





28It means, if you choose:
￿ zero e⁄ort level, it implies zero cost to you and no revenue,
￿ e⁄ort level 1, it implies a cost of 0.1 tokens to you and a revenue of 2 tokens,
￿ e⁄ort level 2, it implies a cost of 0.3 tokens to you and it generates a revenues of 3.3 tokens
￿ e⁄ort level 3, it implies a cost of 0.6 tokens to you and it generates revenues of 4 tokens.
It means that the higher the level of e⁄ort, the higher the revenue for the ￿rm, the higher the
probability that the manager receives a bonus, and the higher the cost for you.
Your earnings will be the sum of the earnings in the 30 periods of the experiment converted into
euros plus 3e for showing up. The conversion rate for your earnings (and the manager￿ s earnings) is:
5 tokens = 1e, i.e. each token is worth 0.20e.
Please raise your hand, if you have any question.
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